EndGame/site.conf

#right now there is a lot of logging to error_log so during an attack those logs will fill the disk eventually.
#a good idea would be to use a syslog server and log to a socket instead of a file for IO optimization
#logging could also be disabled in production

#depending on cluster setup some things can be changed here.
#keepalive 128; or proxy_bind on multiple local ips can be used to mitigate local port exhaustion
#most likely with this setup it's not the case
#if this runs on the same machine as the application server UNIX sockets should be used instead of TCP
upstream tor {
	server	unix:/run/tor_pass1.sock weight=10 fail_timeout=30s;
	server	unix:/run/tor_pass2.sock weight=10 fail_timeout=30s;
}

access_by_lua_no_postpone on;
lua_package_path "/etc/nginx/resty/?.lua;;";

init_by_lua_block {
	allowed_hosts = {
--torconfig		"mainonion",
--torconfig		"masterbalanceonion",
--i2pconfig		"i2paddress"
	}

	function in_array(tab, val)
		for index, value in ipairs(tab) do
			if value == val then
				return true
			end
		end
		return nil
	end

	function split(str, sep)
		local result = {}
		local regex = ("([^%s]+)"):format(sep)
		for each in str:gmatch(regex) do
			table.insert(result, each)
		end
		return result
	end

	local function calc_circuit(proxyheaderip)
		if not proxyheaderip then
			return
		end
		local cg = split(proxyheaderip, ":")
		local g1 = cg[5]
		local g2 = cg[6]

		local glen = string.len(g1)
		if (glen < 4) then
			for i = (4 - glen),1,-1 do
			 g1 = "0" .. g1
			 ::loop_label_1::
			end
		end
		glen = string.len(g2)
		if (glen < 4) then
			for i = (4 - glen),1,-1 do
				g2 = "0" .. g2
				::loop_label_2::
			end
		end

		local d1 = (string.sub(g1,1,1) .. string.sub(g1,2,2))
		local d2 = (string.sub(g1,3,3) .. string.sub(g1,4,4))
		local d3 = (string.sub(g2,1,1) .. string.sub(g2,2,2))
		local d4 = (string.sub(g2,3,3) .. string.sub(g2,4,4))
		local circuit_id = ((((bit.lshift(tonumber(d1, 16), 24)) + (bit.lshift(tonumber(d2, 16), 16))) + (bit.lshift(tonumber(d3, 16), 8))) + tonumber(d4, 16))
		return circuit_id
	end 

	function kill_circuit(premature, clientip, headerip)
		local circuitid = calc_circuit(headerip)
		if not circuitid then
			return
		end
		local sockfile = "unix:/etc/tor/c1"
		local response = "Closing circuit " .. circuitid .. " "
		local sock = ngx.socket.tcp()
		sock:settimeout(1000)
		local ok, err = sock:connect(sockfile)
		if not ok then
			ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "failed to connect to tor: " .. err)
			return
		end
		ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "connected to tor")

		local bytes, err = sock:send("authenticate \"torauthpassword\"\n")
		if not bytes then
			ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "failed authenticate to tor: " .. err)
			return
		end
		local data, err, partial = sock:receive()
		if not data then
			ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "failed receive data from tor: " .. err)
			return
		end
		local response = response .. " " .. data

		local bytes, err = sock:send("closecircuit " .. circuitid .. "\n")
		if not bytes then
			ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "failed send data to tor: " .. err)
			return
		end
		local data, err, partial = sock:receive()
		if not data then
			ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "failed receive data from tor: " .. err)
			return
		end
		local response = response .. " " .. data

		ngx.log(ngx.ERR, response)
		sock:close()
		return
	 end	
}

#rate limits should be set to the maximum number of resources (css/images/iframes) a page will load. Those should be kept to a minimum for performance reasons
#limiting by proxy_protocol_addr works only if tor is properly passing HiddenServiceExportCircuitID in haproxy form.
#limiting by cookie_<name> works regardless and must be used, otherwise an attacker can solve a captcha by hand and add it to a script/bot to spam
#limiting by X-I2P-DestHash works when using i2p and passing the request to nginx

#torconfiglimit_req_zone $proxy_protocol_addr zone=circuits:50m rate=requestratelimitvaluer/s;
limit_req_zone $cookie_dcap zone=capcookie:50m rate=requestratelimitvaluer/s;
#i2pconfiglimit_req_zone $http_x_i2p_desthash zone=i2pdesthash:50m rate=requestratelimitvaluer/s;

#caching of dynamic static elements (admin controlled only!)
proxy_cache_path /etc/nginx/cache/ levels=1:2 keys_zone=static:60m use_temp_path=off max_size=500m;

#proxy_protocol only makes sense with V3 onions (exportcircuitid) otherwise it will break things.
#kill_circuit can't be used without it
server {
#torconfig	listen unix:/var/run/nginx1 proxy_protocol bind;
#i2pconfig	listen 127.0.0.1:6969 backlog=65536 reuseport;
#i2pconfig	allow 127.0.0.1;
#torconfig	allow unix:;
	deny all;

	proxy_cache_key "$host$request_uri$is_args$args";
	proxy_cache_valid 200 1d;
	proxy_cache_min_uses 1;
	proxy_cache_use_stale   error timeout invalid_header http_500 http_502 http_503 http_504;
	proxy_ignore_headers X-Accel-Expires Expires Cache-Control;
	proxy_set_header Host $host;
	proxy_cache_lock on;
	proxy_cache_background_update on;
	proxy_cache_revalidate on;
	proxy_cache_methods GET;

	more_clear_headers 'Server:*';
	more_clear_headers 'Vary*';
	more_clear_headers 'kill*';

	#the following is an example of how to cache static content on the front
	#this reduces the amount of requests and makes your site appear faster.
#	location /favicon.ico {
#	    limit_except GET {
#            deny all;
#        }
#        proxy_cache static;
#        proxy_pass http://tor;
#    }
#
#	location ~* ^/((images|fonts|css)/)?.*\.(ico|css|jpeg|jpg|png|ttf|webp|pdf)$ {
#	    limit_except GET {
#            deny all;
#        }
#        proxy_cache static;
#        proxy_pass http://tor;
#    }

	#what do do when rate limit is triggered, blacklist the cookie (if exists) and kill circuit
	location @ratelimit {
		error_log /var/log/nginx/ratelimit.log;
		access_by_lua_block {
		local pa = "no_proxy"
		if ngx.var.proxy_protocol_addr ~= nil then
			 pa = ngx.var.proxy_protocol_addr
		end
		local cook = require "resty.cookie"
		local cookie, err = cook:new()
		if not cookie then
			ngx.log(ngx.ERR, err)
			return
		end
		local field, err = cookie:get("dcap")
		if field then
			local blocked_cookies = ngx.shared.blocked_cookies
			blocked_cookies:set(field, 1, sessionconfigvalue)
		end

		ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "Rate limited " .. ngx.var.remote_addr .. "|" .. pa)

		if pa ~= "no_proxy" then
			 local ok, err = ngx.timer.at(0, kill_circuit, ngx.var.remote_addr, ngx.var.proxy_protocol_addr)
			 if not ok then
				ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "failed to create timer: ", err)
			 return
			 end
		end
		ngx.exit(444)
		}
	 }

	#what do do when waf is triggered, just show the error page and kill circuit for now.
	#naxsi seems to kick in before everything else except rate limiter but if it does trash traffic won't make it to the application servers anyway
	#doesn't make sense to blacklist cookie as it will annoy users

	location /waf {
		error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log;
		default_type text/html;
		content_by_lua_block {
			ngx.say("<head><title>Error</title></head>")
			ngx.say("<body bgcolor=\"white\">")
			ngx.say("<center><h1>Error</h1></center>")
			ngx.say("<hr><center><p>Your browser sent a request that this server could not understand.</p></center>")
			ngx.say("<center><p>Most likely your input contains invalid characters (\" , `, etc.) that except for passwords should not be used.</p></center>")
			ngx.say("<center><p>This may also happen if you are trying to send contact information or external links.</p></center>")
			ngx.say("<center><p>Please go back, check your input and try again.</p></center></body>")

			proxyip = "no_proxy"
			torip = ngx.var.remote_addr
			if ngx.var.proxy_protocol_addr ~= nil then
				 proxyip = ngx.var.proxy_protocol_addr
			end
			
			ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "WAF triggered " .. torip .. "|" .. proxyip)
			if proxyip ~= "no_proxy" then
				 local ok, err = ngx.timer.at(0, kill_circuit, torip, proxyip)
				 if not ok then
					ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "failed to create timer: ", err)
				 	return
				 end
			end
		}
	}

	location @502 {
		default_type text/html;
		content_by_lua_block {
			ngx.say("<head><title>502 Timeout</title></head>")
			ngx.say("<body bgcolor=\"white\">")
			ngx.say("<center><h1>502 Timeout</h1></center>")
			ngx.say("<hr><center><p>It seems this endgame front doesn't have a stable connection to the backend right now.</p></center>")
			ngx.say("<center><p>To fix it you can try to reload the page. If that doesn't work, and you end back here, try the following:</p></center>")
			ngx.say("<center><p>On Tor, if getting a new circuit doesn't work, Try to get a brand new Tor identity. If that doesn't work come back later.</p></center>")
			ngx.say("<center><p>On I2P, just try and refresh again and again. If that doesn't work restart I2P and wait a couple minutes before trying again.</p></center></body>")
		}
	}
	
	location /kill {
		access_by_lua_block {
			proxyip = "no_proxy"
			torip = ngx.var.remote_addr
			if ngx.var.proxy_protocol_addr ~= nil then
				 proxyip = ngx.var.proxy_protocol_addr
			end
			
			ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "Kill area visited" .. torip .. "|" .. proxyip)

			local cook = require "resty.cookie"
			local cookie, err = cook:new()
			if not cookie then
				ngx.log(ngx.ERR, err)
				return
			end

			local field, err = cookie:get("dcap")
			if field then
				local blocked_cookies = ngx.shared.blocked_cookies
				blocked_cookies:set(field, 1, sessionconfigvalue)
			end

			if proxyip ~= "no_proxy" then
				 local ok, err = ngx.timer.at(0, kill_circuit, torip, proxyip)
				 if not ok then
					ngx.log(ngx.ERR, "failed to create timer: ", err)
				 	return
				 end
			end
			ngx.exit(444)
		}
	}

	location / {
		aio threads;
		aio_write on;
		#access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log;
		error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log;

		#rate limits per circuit ID (prevents many requests on a single tor circuit)
#torconfig		limit_req zone=circuits burst=streamratelimitvalue nodelay;
#torconfig		error_page 503 =503 @ratelimit;

		#rate limits based on captcha cookie. if an attacker or bot solves the capcha by hand and inputs the cookie in a script
		#the cookie will be blacklisted by all fronts (eventually) and subsequent requests dropped.
		limit_req zone=capcookie burst=streamratelimitvalue nodelay;
		error_page 503 =503 @ratelimit;

		#rate limits based on the i2p destination hash (prevents many requests on a single i2p client connection) *DOES NOT KILL CIRCUITS*
#i2pconfig		limit_req zone=i2pdesthash burst=streamratelimitvalue nodelay;
#i2pconfig		error_page 503 =503 @ratelimit;

		error_page 502 =502 @502;

		#check if access captcha is solved and other things
		access_by_lua_file lua/cap.lua;

		SecRulesEnabled;
		#LearningMode;
		DeniedUrl /waf;
		CheckRule "$SQL >= 8" BLOCK;
		CheckRule "$RFI >= 8" BLOCK;
		CheckRule "$TRAVERSAL >= 4" BLOCK;
		CheckRule "$EVADE >= 4" BLOCK;
		CheckRule "$XSS >= 8" BLOCK;
		include "/etc/nginx/naxsi_whitelist.rules";
		proxy_set_header Host $host;
		proxy_pass http://backendurl;
		header_filter_by_lua_block {
			local cookie, err = cook:new()
				if not cookie then
				ngx.log(ngx.ERR, err)
				return
			end

			if ngx.resp.get_headers()['kill'] ~= nil then
				local field, err = cookie:get("dcap")
				if field then
					local blocked_cookies = ngx.shared.blocked_cookies
					blocked_cookies:set(field, 1, sessionconfigvalue)
				end
			end
		}
	}
}